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Ohio Rule 404(A) governs the circumstantial use of character evidence, i.e., the admissibility of evidence of a character trait to prove that a person acted in conformity with
that trait on a particular occasion (character-as-proof-ofconduct).
This use of character is sometimes referred to as
"propensity'' or "disposition" evidence. See State v. Curry, 43
Ohio St2d 66, 68, 330 N.E.2d 720 (1975) ("propensity or inclination to commit crime"); State v. Hector, 19 Ohio St2d
167, 174,249 N.E:2d 912 (1969) (common law prohibited
prior conduct evidence if offered "merely" to show "a trait,
disposition or propensity toward the commission of crime").
For example, a person's character for honesty may be circumstantially relevant to a theft charge because it could be
argued that a person with an honest character tends to act
in conformity with that character and thus would be less likely to steal. Similarly, it could be argued that a dishonest person tends to act in conformity with that character and thus is
more likely to steal.
Both Rule 404(A) and Rule 404(B) prohibit the circumstantial use of character evidence.
Exceptions. Many of the problems inherent in the use of
character disappear, or at least diminish, when an accused
offers evidence of her own character or that of a victim.
Accordingly, Rule 404(A) recognizes three exceptions: (1) a
criminal defendant's character, (2) a victim's character, and
(3) a witness's character. With exceptions (1) and (2), it is
the accused's or victim's character at the time of the
charged offense that is relevant In contrast, exception (3)
involves a witness's character at the time of trial. In prosecutions for rape or gross sexual imposition the Ohio rape
shield law, and not Rule 404(A), controls.
Methods of proof. Rule 404(A) specifies the conditions
under which character evidence is admissible. The rule
does not specify the methods of proof that may be used to
establish character. Rule 405(A) governs the methods of
proof. Generally, only opinion and reputation evidence (not
specific acts) are permitted to prove character.
Other-acts evidence. Rule 404(B) provides that evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts, although not admissible to prove character, may be admissible for some other
purpose, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, prepa-

ration, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident This subject will be discussed in the next issue.
POLICY PROHIBITING CHARACTER &
OTHER-ACTS EVIDENCE
Although character evidence may be probative in some
cases, it is generally excluded because it "usually is laden
with the dangerous baggage of prejudice, distraction, and
time-consumption:' 1 McCormick, Evidence§ 188, at 654
(5th ed. 1999). See also Michelson v. United States, 335
US 469, 4 75-76 (1948) ("The inquiry is not rejected because character is irrelevant; on the contrary, it is said to
weigh too much with the jury and to so overpersuade them
as to prejudge one with a bad general record and deny him
a fair opportunity to defend against a particular charge.");
Boyd v. United States, 142 U.S. 450, 458 (1892) (Prior robberies "only tended to prejudice the defendants with the jurors, to draw their minds away from the real issue, and to
produce the impression that they were wretches whose lives
were of no value to the community.").
The Ohio cases are in accord. In State v. Lytle, 48 Ohio
St2d 391, 402, 358 N.E.2d 623 (1976), vacated on other
grounds by 438 U.S. 910 (1978), the Ohio Supreme Court
commented: "Although character is not irrelevant, the danger of prejudice outweighs the probative value of such evidence." See also State v. Mann, 19 Ohio St.3d 34, 37, 482
N.E.2d 592 (1985) ("[T]he state was impermissibly allowed
to show that appellant had a propensity to commit crimes,
i.e., to infer from the fact that he had previously violated a
civil injunction that he had likewise committed the crime
charged [resisting arrest].").
In State v. Curry, 43 Ohio St.2d 66, 68, 330 N.E.2d 720
(1975)(quoting Whitty v. State, 34 Wis.2d 278, 149 N.W.2d
557 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 959 (1968), the Court
identified the following dangers associated with character
evidence:
(1) The overstrong tendency to believe the defendant
guilty of the charge merely because he is a person likely
to do such acts; (2) the tendency to condemn not because he is believed guilty of the present charge but because he has escaped punishment from other offenses;
(3) the injustice of attacking one who is not prepared to
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demonstrate the attacking evidence is fabricated; and (4)
the confusion of issues which might result from bringing
in evidence of other crimes.
These dangers have crystallized into a general prohibition against the use of character evidence: "A hallmark of.
the American criminal justice system is the principle that
proof that the accused committed a crime other than the
one for which he is on trial is not admissible when its sole
· purpose is to show the accused's propensity or inclination to
commit crime." State v. Curry, 43 Ohio St.2d 66, 68, 330
N.E.2d 720 (1975). See also State v. Jamison, 49 Ohio
St.3d 182, 184, 552 N.E.2d 180 (1990) ("Under longstanding principles of Anglo-American jurisprudence, an accused
can not be convicted of one crime by proving he committed
other crimes or is a bad person."), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
881 (1990).
The accused's character may be improperly introduced in
a variety of ways:
Mug shots. E.g., State v. Breedlove, 26 Ohio St.2d 178,
184, 271 N.E.2d 238 (1971) ("Under the circumstances in
the case at bar, we believe it unjustifiable for the state, on direct examination, to present police mug shots, bearing police identification numbers, from which a reasonable inference can be drawn that the defendant, qt some indefinite
time in the past had had trouble with the law."); State v.
Wilkinson, 26 Ohio St.2d 185,271 N.E.2d 242 (1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 968 (1971 ); State v. Yarbrough, 129 Ohio
App.3d 437, 440, 717 N.E.2d 1173 (1998) (The prosecution
may not use a "mug shot" of the defendant in a photo array
because it "suggested to the jury that [the defendant] had
prior criminal involvement."); State v. Wills, 120 Ohio App.3d
320,327, 697 N.E.2d 1072 (1997)("Under the circumstances, we find that the single mention of the term 'mug
shot' did not violate Evid.R. 404(B)."), appeal dismissed, 80
Ohio St.3d 1409, 684 N.E.2d 703 (1997); State v. Tolbert, 70
Ohio App.3d 372, 387, 591 N.E.2d 325 (1990)(police identification numbers were obscured), appeal dismissed, 58
Ohio St. 3d 701, 569 N.E.2d 504 (1991 ).
Prior arrests. E.g., State v. Jones, 83 Ohio App.3d 723,
737,615 N.E.2d 713 (1992)("Generally, reference to prior
arrests of the defendant is prohibited.").
Prior indictments. E.g., State v. Hector, 19 Ohio St.2d
167, 178, 249 N.E.2d 912 (1969) (ordinarily the credibility of
a witness may not be attacked by "proof of indictment").
Attacks on the character of the defendant's friends.
E.g., State v. Keenan, 66 Ohio St.3d 402, 409, 613 N.E.2d
203 (1993) ("By arguing explicitly that the bad character of
Keenan's friends reflected on Keenan's character, when that
character was wholly irrelevant, the prosecutor ignored the
fact that ... 'an accused cannot be convicted ... by proving he
... is a bad person."') (quoting State v. Jamison, 49 Ohio
St.3d 182, 184, 552 N.E.2d 180 (1990), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 881 (1990)).
Cross-examination without a good-faith basis. E.g.,
State v. Hunt, 97 Ohio App.3d 372, 375, 646 N.E.2d 889
(1994) ("At no time did the prosecutor put forth any extrinsic
evidence to establish this f§ct [taking gasoline to and threatening to blow up a house].").
·
Profile evidence. E.g., State v. Roquemore, 85 Ohio
App.3d 448, 620 N.E.2d 110 (1993) (error to permit criminal
profilist's testimony that impermissibly placed accused's
character in evidence); State v. Smith, 84 Ohio App.3d 647,
661, 617 N.E.2d 1160 (1992) (evidence suggested that accused was a pedophile and this "aspect of his personality

was then offered as a propensity from which the jury was
asked to infer that he had acted in accordance with his
propensity to commit the crimes alleged"); State v. McMillan,
69 Ohio App.3d 36, 51, 590 N.E.2d 23 (1990), appeal dismissed, 71 Ohio St.3d 1452, 644 N.E.2d 656 (1995) (profile
of sex abusers improper "group character evidence").
Syndrome evidence. E.g., State v. Pargeon, 64 Ohio
App.3d 679, 681,582 N.E.2d 665 (1991) (In a domestic violence prosecution, evidence that the accused's wife is a battered woman "really serves as evidence of the prior bad
acts ... from which the inference may be drawn that appellant has the propensity to beat his wife and that he beat her
on this particular occasion. This is precisely the prohibited
inference that is excluded under Evid. R. 404(B).").

ACCUSED'S CHARACTER
Rule 404(A)(1).recognizes an exception to the general
prohibition against the admissibility of character evidence.
In a criminal case, the accused may offer evidence of a pertinent trait of his character. Once the accused introduces
such evidence, the prosecution may cross-examine the defense character witness and offer rebuttal character evidence.
Prior law
Rule 404(A)(1) did not change Ohio law. It had long
been the rule in Ohio that in "a criminal prosecution, until a
defendant offers evidence of his general good character or
reputation, the state may not offer testimony of his bad character or bad reputation." State v. Cochrane, 151 Ohio St.
128, 84 N.E.2d 742 (1949) (syllabus, para 3). Accord State
v. Adams, 53 Ohio St.2d 223, 374 N.E.2d 137 (1978), vacated on other grounds, 439 U.S. 811 (1978); State v. Lytle, 48
Ohio St.2d 391, 358 N.E.2d 623 (1976), vacated on other
grounds, 438 U.S. 910 (1978); State v. Curry, 43 Ohio St.2d
66,330 N.E.2d 720 (1975); State v. Hector, 19 Ohio St.2d
167,249 N.E.2d 912 (1969); State v. Markowitz, 138 Ohio
St. 106,33 N.E.2d 1 (1941); Saba v. State, 119 Ohio St.
231, 163 NE 28 (1928); Hamilton v. State, 34 Ohio St. 82
(1877); Griffin v. State, 14 Ohio St. 55 (1862).
Limitations
There are several important limitations on admissibility in
this context. First, it is the defendant's character at the time
of the charged offense that is relevant. See Wroe v. State,
20 Ohio St: 460, 472 (1870) ("evidence ... as to the bad
character of the defendant subsequent to the commission of
the offense ought to have been excluded"); 1 McCormick,
Evidence § 191, at 675 (5th ed. 1999) ("confined to reputation at approximately the time of the alleged offense").
Second, Rule 405(A) limits the methods by which the accused may introduce character evidence. Under that provision only opinion and reputation evidence, and not specific
instances of conduct, may be used.
Third, in prosecutions for rape and gross sexual imposition the rape shield statute preempts the rule.
Personal History
Typically, an accused introduces evidence of good character through the testimony of character witnesses.
Sometimes, however, character evidence or positive aspects of the accused's background is brought out by the defense during the examination of the accused or other defense witness. See 1 McCormick, Evidence § 191, at 676
(5th ed. 1999) ("By relating a personal history supportive of
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good character, however, the defendant may achieve the
·
same result.").
This is often a risky tactic. Once the issue is injected into
the trial in a significant way, the prosecution's right to rebut
may be triggered. E.g., State v. Robinson, 98 Ohio App.3d
560 570, 649 N.E.2d 18 (1994) ("Appellant herein introduced evidence on direct examination pertaining to his
peaceful character via his membership in a beneficent
branch of the Folks gang .... [T]he trial court did not abuse
its discretion in allowing the state to cross-examine appellant concerning his juvenile adjudication.").
Pertinent Trait
The exception recognized in Rule 404(A)(1) permits the
accused to introduce only evidence of a "pertinent trait of his
character." In other words, the character trait
must be relevant to the crimes charged. 1 McCormick,
Evidence § 191, at 673-7 4 (5th ed. 1999) ("One charged
with theft might offer evidence of honesty, while someone
accused of murder might show that he is peaceable, but not
vice versa."). For example, in Griffin v. State, 14 Ohio St. 55,
63 (1862), the Ohio Supreme Court held that "[t]he general
character which is the proper subject of inquiry should also
have reference to the nature of the charge against the defendant. Thus, in the present case, the defendant being
charged with a crime necessarily importing dishonesty,
called witnesses who gave evidence tending to show a general good character for honesty." See also Saba v. State,
119 Ohio St. 231, 239, 163 NE 28 (1928) ("In a murder
case, such reputation must relate to his being a peaceable,
law-abiding citizen.").
In Booker v. State, 33 App 338 341-42, 169 NE 588
(1929), an appellate court observed:
In showing his character, however, [the defendant] is confined to that trait of character that is inconsistent with guilt
of the offense charged in the indictment. The accused in
this case attempted to qualify a witness to testify to the
general reputation of the accused for truth and veracity....
Such a reputation might properly be shown in a case of
perjury, but it is not a trait involved in unlawful possession
of liquor. He then attempted to qualify a witness as to
the "general reputation ... for being a peaceable, quiet,
law-abiding citizen." Objection was made .... The court
sustained this objection, observing that the crime
charged was not one of violence, and in this the court
was right, for it is of course true that bootlegging may be
both peaceable and quiet.
Both Saba and Booker permit the introduction of the general
character trait of being a "law-abiding" person. Such general character may not be encompassed by Rule 404(A) since
it is arguably not sufficiently "pertinent" to the crime
charged, but the federal cases go the other way. E.g., United
States v. Angelini, 678 F.2d 380 (1st Cir. 1982) (accused's
character as law-abiding citizen always admissible); United
States v. Hewitt, 634 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1981)(same).
This is probably the best interpretation. See1 McCormick,
Evidence § 191, at 67 4 (5th ed. 1999) ("A few general
traits, like being law-abiding, seem sufficiently relevant to almost any accusation:"). It, however, is a two.:edged sword.
The prosecution rebuttal evidence for the character trait of
honesty should be limited to dishonesty; the accused's character for violence is not relevant. See 1 McCormick,
Evidence § 191, at 676 (5th ed. 1999) ("[O]nce the defendant gives evidence of pertinent character traits to show that
he is not guilty, his claim of possession of these traits- but

only these traits - is open to rebuttal by cross-examination
or direct testimony of prosecution witnesses."). But if the accused introduces evidence of law-abiding character, the
prosecution may rebut with any evidence of unlawful conduct- e.g., convictions for assault or possession of drugs.
E.g., United States v. Diaz, 961 F.2d 1417, 1419-20 (9th Cir.
1992) (being prone to criminal activity).
Jury instructions
In some cases, evidence of good character offered by the
accused may have a significant impact. As the United
States Supreme Court has noted: "The circumstances may
be such that an established reputation for good character, if
it is relevant to the issue, would alone create a reasonable
doubt, although, without it, the other evidence would be
convincing." Edgington v. United States, 164 U.S. 361, 366
(1896). Accord Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469,
476 (1948) ("[S]uch testimony alone, in some circumstances, may be enough to raise a reasonable doubt of
guilt.").
Most federal courts hold that the "standing alone-reasonable doubt" instruction need not be given. E.g., United
States v. Pujana-Mena, 949 F.2d 24, 28 n. 2 (2d Cir. 1991 ).
Some courts, however, take a different view- at least under
certain circumstances. E.g., United States v. Foley, 598 F.2d
1323, 1336-37 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1043
(1980); United States v. Lewis, 482 F.2d 632, 637 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (whenever the accused offers character evidence);
Oertle v. United States, 370 F.2d 719, 726-27 (1Oth Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 943 (1967).
Prosecution Rebuttal
Once the accused has introduced evidence of a pertinent
character trait, the prosecution may offer character evidence
in rebuttal. In State v. Grubb, 111 Ohio App.3d 277, 675
N.E.2d 1353 (1996), a domestic violence case, the court of
appeals discussed the requirement that the defendant introduce evidence of a pertinent character trait before the prosecution is permitted to introduce rebuttal evidence:
[D]efendant did not put his good character in issue in this
case. Defendant did not testify on direct examination tha
he is a peaceful person or that he has never assaulted
any woman, including his former wife. Rather, it was the
state that elicited that testimony from defendant on
cross-examination by the use of specific questions designed for just that purpose. The defense objected, unsuccessfully, to that questioning. Because defendant
made no claim at trial regarding his own good character,
i.e., did not put his character in issue, the testimony of
defendant's former wife ... was not admissible pursuant tc
Evid.R. 404(A)(1) to rebut same. The prosecution cannoi
circumvent the limited nature of the exception provided ir
Evid.R. 404(A)(1) by putting the character of an accused
in issue via its own questions, and then present evidencE
to rebut the answers. ld. at 281.
In State v. Austin, 115 Ohio App.3d 761, 765, 686 N.E.2d
324 (1996), the court of appeals held that the defendant
does not raise the issue of his own character when he introduces evidence of the victim's character:
Evid.R. 404(A)(I) and (2)are mutually exclusive. When
an accused injects the issue of the victim's character into
the case, either by offering character evidence in accordance with Evid.R. 405 or by coupling self-defense with
evidence of first aggression of the victim in a homicide
case, the accused does not by virtue of these elections
open the issue of the accused's own character. The
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issue of the accused's character is only introduced in accordance with the provisions of Evid.R. 404(A)(1) when
the accused offerspositive character evidence as prescribed by the procedures delineated in Evid.R. 405.
The same limitations that apply to character evidence offered by the defense apply to the prosecution. First, the
character trait that is the subject of rebuttal must be "pertinent" to the crime charged. E.g., State v. Manning, 74 Ohio
App.3d 19, 28, 598 N.E.2d 25 (1991) (prosecution permitted
to call rebuttal witnesses after defense witnesses testified
that the accused was quiet, timid, and nonviolent), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 918 (1992). For example, in a theft case the
defense character witnesses should testify about the defendant's character for honesty. Similarly, the rebuttal witnesses' testimony should be limited to the same trait, i.e., dishonesty. See 1 McCormick, Evidence § 191, at 676 (5th ed.
1999) ("[O]nce the defendant gives evidence of pertinent
character traits to show that he is not guilty, his claim of possession of these traits- but only these traits - is open to rebuttal by cross-examination or direct testimony of prosecution witnesses.").
Second, Rule 405(A) specifies the methods of proof
which are available for the presentation of rebuttal evidence.
Thus, the prosecution, like the accused, is limited to opinion
'
or reputation evidence.
Cross-Examination
The prosecution also may challenge defense character
evidence through cross-examination of the character witnesses. Once the accused calls a defense character witness, Rule 405(A) permits the use of specific acts during
crosscexamination. Thus, a reputation or opinion witness
may be asked on cross~examination "if she has heard" or "if
she knows" of specific acts that reflect upon the character
trait addressed by that witness. The cross-examiner, however, "must take the witness's answer"; that is, extrinsic evidence of the specific act is not admissible. In State v. Elliott,
25 Ohio St.2d 249,267 N.E.2d 806 (1971)(syllabus, para.
2), vacated, 408 U.S. 939 (1972), the Ohio Supreme Court
explained:
A character witness may be cross-examined as to the existence of reports of particular acts, vices, or associations of the person concerning whom he has testified
which are inconsistent with the reputation attributed to
him by the witness - not to establish the truth of the
facts, but to test the credibility of the witness, and to ascer~ain what weight or value is to be given his testimony.
Such inconsistent testimony tends to show either that the
witness is unfamiliar with the reputation concerning
which he has testified, or that his standards of what constitutes good repute are unsound.
The Court cited Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469
(1948), the leading case on this subject. Michelson,
charged with bribery of an IRS agent, called witnesses who
testified about his good character for truth and honesty. The
United States Supreme Court upheld the prosecutor's right
to ask these witnesses whether they "had heard" about
Michelson's 20-year-oldeonviction for a trademark violation
and 27 -year-old arrest for receiving stolen property.
The justification for this type of examination is that the
prosecution has the right to test the basis for the character
witness's testimony. A character witness who is unaware of
a defendant's prior arrests and convictions would not appear to be very informed about the defendant's reputation.
ld. at 483 ("The inquiry as to an arrest is permissible also

because the prosecution has a right to test the qualifications
of the witness to bespeak the community opinion. If one
never heard the speculations and rumors in which even
one's friends indulge upon his arrest, the jury may doubt
whether he is capable of giving any very reliable conclusions as to his reputation.").
If the witness is knows of negative information but ignores it, the witness's standards for assessing reputation
are drawn into question. In Michelson Justice Jackson used
the following illustration:
A classic example in the books is a character witness in a
trial for muroer. She testified she grew up with defendant,
knew his reputation for peace and quiet, and that it was
good. On cross-examination she was asked if she had·
heard that the defendant had shot anybody and, if so,
how many. She answered, 'Three or four," and gave the
names of two but could not recall the names of the others. She still insisted, however, that he was of "good
character:' The jury seems to have valued her information more highly than her judgment [and convicted]." ld at
479 ri. 16.
Cases decided under the Rules are in accord. In State v.
Jackson, 57 Ohio St.3d 29, 39,565 N.E.2d 549 (1991), cert
denied, 502 U.S. 835 86 (1991), a defense character witness testified in the penalty phase of a capital case that the
defendant was peaceful. On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked if the witness knew that the accused had assaulted and robbed three older women in 1983 and assaulted another woman in 1985. The Ohio Supreme Court upheld this line of questioning: "[The witness's] characterization of Jackson as sweet, gentle, and nonviolent opened the
door for cross-examination about specific instances of conduct sharply at variance with her opinion testimony." See
also State v. Miller, 122 Ohio App.3d 111, 122, 701 N.E.2d
390 1997) ("The fact that Miller was arrested for a drug-related offense could affect his reputation as a person who
does not deal narcotics. This instance of Miller's misconduct was relevant to the testimony of the character witness,
and was admissible to impeach [that witness's] statement
that Miller had a reputation as a person who does not deal
narcotics."); State v. Collins, 97 Ohio App.3d 438, 448-50,
646 N.E.2d 1142 {1994){After a defense character witness
testified that the accused did not fight and was not a troublemaker, prosecutor cross-examined on prior arrests for carrying a concealed weapon, resisting arrest, and two misdemeanor theft convictions.), appeal dismissed, 70 Ohio St.3d
1440, 638 N.E.2d 1044 (1994).
Good faith basis-in-fact requirement. The risk that the
jury will use this information for an improper purpose- to
show character- is great notwithstanding a limiting instruction. Moreover, the practice possesses the potential for
abuse. As Wigmore observed: 'This method of inquiry or
cross-examination is frequently resorted to by counsel for
the very purpose of injuring by indirection a character which
they are forbidden directly to attack in that way; they rely
upon the mere putting of the question (not caring that it is
answered negatively) to convey their covert insinuation." 3A
Wigmore, Evidence§ 988, at 921 (Chadbourn rev. 1970).
Consequently, courts have required that this type of
cross-examination be conducted in good faith, i.e., that the
prosecutor have a basis in fact for asking the question. See
1 McCormick, Evidence § 191, at 677 (5th ed. 1999) ("This
power of the cross-examiner to reopen old wounds is replete with possibilities for prejudice .... As a precondition to
4

cros1-examination about other wrongs, the prosecutor
should reveal, outside the heqring of the jury, what his basis
is for believing in the rumors or incidents he proposes to ask
about. The court should then determine whether there is a
substantial basis for the cross-examination.").
The Michelson Court recognized that this type of crossexamination placed a "heavy responsibility on trial courts to
protect the practice from any misuse." Michelson v. United
States, 335 U.S. 469, 480 (1948). The Court went on to
point out that the trial judge in that case took pains to ascertain, out of presence of the jury, that the target of the question was an actual event, which would probably result in
some comment among acquaintances if not injury to defendant's reputation. He satisfied himself that counsel was not
merely taking a random shot at a reputation imprudently exposed or asking a groundless question to waft an unwarranted innuendo into the jury box. ld. at 481. Similarly, the
Ohio Supreme Court in Elliott remarked: "If the defendant
had never been convicted of a felonious assault, such question by the prosecutor, being made in bad faith, would be
the predicate for error." State v. Elliott, 25 Ohio St.2d 249,
253, 267 N.E.2d 806 (1971), vacated, 408 U.S. 939 (1972).
See also State v. Hart, 72 Ohio App.3d 92, 98, 593 N.E.2d
463 (1991), appeal dismissed, 61 Ohio St.3d 1418,574
N.E.2d 1089 (1 991) (recognizing the good faith requirement).
Pertinent trait. Only acts which bear some relationship
to the particular character trait offered by the defendant can
properly be raised on cross-examination. For example, if
the character witness testifies about the defendant's character for honesty, the witness cannot be cross-examined about
violent acts. See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469,
483-84 (1948); State v. Krout, 6 Ohio App.3d 5, 7, 451
N.E.2d 515 (1982) (witnesses who testify about truthful
character cannot be cross-examined about drug crimes).
Remoteness. Acts which are too remote are not the
proper subject of cross-examination. The question concerning the 27-year-old arrest was permitted in Michelson only
because "two of [the character] witnesses dated their acquaintance with defendant as commencing thirty years before the trial." Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 484
(1948).
Effect of current charge. Cross-examination of defense
character witnesses concerning the effect of the current
charges on the defendant's reputation or on the witness's
opinion are improper because the question asks the witness
"to indulge in a hypothetical assumption of the defendant's
guilt." 1McCormick, Evidence§ 191, at 677 (5th ed. 1999).
See also United States v. Mason, 993 F.2d 406, 409 (4th
Cir. 1993) (question improper; citing numerous cases).

tim's character until the defense "opens the door." See State
v. White, 15 Ohio St.2d 146, 150-51, 239 N.E.2d 65 (1968);
Reed v. State, 98 Ohio St. 279, 120 NE 701(1918);
Upthegrove v. State, 37 Ohio St. 662 (1882); State v.
Schmidt, 65 Ohio App.2d 239,417 N.E.2d 1264 (1979).
The Ohio Supreme Court has noted. that character evidence about a victim "is admissible when itrelates directly
to the circumstances of the crime and is not offered to elicit
sympathy from the jury." State v. Allen, 73 Ohio St.3d 626
633, 653 N.E.2d 675 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1178
(1 996). In Allen, the Court upheld the admission of what
might be characterized as evidence of the victim's good
character in the prosecution's case-in-chief because this evidence was relevant to the circumstances of the crime:
Testimony that [the victim] did not drink or smoke was
relevant, because a wine bottle and cigarette butts were
found in her house. Evidence showing [the victim's] religious devotion was also relevant for noncharacter purposes. The "praying hands" design on the wallet identified it as hers. Her dedication to helping sinners
"straighten ... out" explained her friendship with [the defendant]. Her habit of baking things for people was relevant to her spending habits .... [The victim's] friend ...
testified that [the victim] rose early for morning devotions.
This evidence of [the victim's] habit was relevant because
[she] had not put out her garbage on the morning [her
body was discovered]. [The victim's] habitual early rising
explained why this nonoccurrence was unusual, narrowing the time of death. ld. at 633-34.
See also State v. Lundgren, 73 Ohio St.3d 474, 486, 653
N.E.2d 304 (1995) ("Lundgren objected to the admission of
two diplomas, an engraved silver dish, a charm necklace,
and a family photograph. He argues that this evidence constituted improper victim character evidence. These items
were introduced to support the identity of the bodies buried
in the barn."), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1178 (1996).
SELF-DEFENSE
At common law, a victim's character was considered relevant in two types of prosecutions: {1) on the issue of selfdefense in homicide and assault cases, and (2) on the issue
of consent in rape cases. In the latter cases, the rape-shield
statute rather than Rule 404 controls. The statute is discussed infra. Consequently, Rule 404(A)(2) will be applicable principally on the self-defense issue.
First aggressor issue
In a homicide or assault case, the defendant may introduce evidence of the victim's violent and aggressive character to show that the victim was the first aggressor, thereby
establishing one element of self-defense. See State v.
Hirsch, 129 Ohio App.3d 294,717 N.E.2d 789 {1998), appeal dismissed, 84 Ohio St.3d 1436, 702 N.E.2d 1213
(1 998). In Hirsch, the prosecution introduced evidence that
the victim got along with everyone and had no enemies.
The court stated: "Pursuant to Evid.R. 404(A), evidence of
the character of the victim as a quiet and peaceable person
is inadmissible except to rebut a defense claim that the victim was the first aggressor.... There was no such claim in
this case, and w_e therefore conclude that the trial court
erred in admitting evidence regarding the victim's character."
ld. at 311.
Methods of Proof
Rule 405(A) limits the methods of proof that the accused
and the prosecution may use to show or to rebut the character of a victim; only reputation or opinion evidence is permit-

VICTIM'S CHARACTER
A second exception to the general prohibition against the
admissibility of character evidence is recognized in Rule
404(A)(2), which permits an accused to present evidence of
a pertinent character trait of the alleged victim of the
charged offense; +McCormick; Evidence § 193, at 681 (5th
ed. 1999) ("There is, however, a risk of a different form of
prejudice. Learning of the victim's bad character could lead
the jury to think that the victim merely 'got what he deserved' and to acquit for that reason.").
Once the accused has introduced such evidence, the
prosecution may offer rebuttal evidence. The prosecution,
however, is prohibited from introducing evidence of the vic-

5

ted. E.g., State v. Cuttiford, 93 Ohio App.3d 546, 554, 639
N.E.2d 472 (1994) ("In conformity with Evid. R. 405(A)
405(A), the trial court permitted two witnesses called by defendant to testify that Banks had a reputation for violent behavior.... [H]owever, the trial court refused to permit witnesses other than defendant to testify regarding specific instances of Banks's violent behavior.").
Homicide cases
There is a special rule in homicide prosecutions. Any evidence that the victim was the first aggressor in a homicide
(but not an assault) case triggers the prosecutidn's right to
introduce rebuttal evidence of the victim's peaceful character. For example, if the accused testifies that the victim was
the first aggressor, but does not introduce character evidence on this issue, the prosecution may nevertheless introduce evidence of the victim's peaceful character in rebuttal
See 1 McCormick, Evidence§ 193, at 681 (5th ed. 1999)
("Since a dead victim cannot attest to his peaceable behavior during the fatal encounter, the last clause of Rule
404(a}(2) provides that whenever the accused claims selfdefense and offers any type of evidence that the deceased
was the first aggressor, the government may reply with evidence of the peaceable character of the deceased."}.
Accused's mental state: communicated character
There is a second use of the victim's violent character
that is also relevant to self-defense; that is, to show its effect
on the accused's state of mind. E.g., State v. Baker, 88 Ohio
App.3d 204, 208, 623 N.E.2d 672 (1993) ("Whether evidence concerning the victim is admissible to prove self-defense depends upon the type of evidence being offered.
Typically, such evidence falls into two general categories: (1)
testimony~concerning th1:3 victim offered to demonstrate the
defendant's state of mind at the time of the incident, and (2)
testimony about the victim's character offered to prove that
the victim was more likely the aggressor.").
Because this use does not involve character-as-proof-ofconduct, neither Rule 404(A) nor Rule 405(A), limiting the
methods of proof to reputation and opinion, apply. Instead,
this issue falls under the general relevance rules, Rules 401
and 403.
This use obviously depends on whether the accused
knew of the victim's character. See State v. Austin; 115
Ohio App.3d 761, 764, 686 N.E.2d 324 (1996) ("A defendant arguing self-defense may testify about specific instances of the victim's prior conduct in order to establish the
defendant's state of mind .... 'These events are admissible in
evidence, not because they establish something about the
victim's character, but because they tend to show why the
defendant believed the victim would kill or severely injure
him."') (quoting State v. Carlson, 31 Ohio App.3d 72, 508
N.E.2d 999 (1986); State v. Marsh, 71 Ohio App.3d 64 70,
593 N.E.2d 35 (1990)("[A] defendant may not introduce evidence of a victim's prior specific instances of conduct to
show the defendant's state of mind unless the defendant
had knowledge of that conduct. If the defendant was not
aware of the victim's prior conduct, that conduct is irrelevant
as itcould not bave affectecj the defendant's state of mind at
the time of the incident."}, appeal dismissed, 60 Ohio St.3d
708, 573 N.E.2d 667 (1991). This includes the accused's
knowledge of the victim's reputation or specific acts of violence; this type of evidence is not hearsay because it is not
offered for the truth (i.e., that the victim was a violent person) but rather to show its effect on the accused.
In contrast, if character evidence is introduced to show

that the victim acted in conformity with that character and
was therefore the first aggressor, the accusecl's awareness
of the victim's character is not relevant. See 1A Wigmore,
Evidence § 63, at 1369 (Tillers rev. 1983) ("[The] additional
element of communication is unnecessary, for the question
is what the deceased probably did, not what the accused
probably thought the deceased was going to do. The inquiry
is one of objective occurrence, not of subjective belief.").
RAPE SHIED LAW
The exceptions for evidence of the accused's character
and the victim's character are both subject to the following
limitation: "however, in prosecutions for rape, gross sexual
imposition, and prostitution, the exceptions provided by
statute enacted by the General Assembly are applicable."
Evid. R. 404(A)(1} & (2). This passage refers to the "rape
shield law" (R.C. 2907.02(D)(rape); R.C. 2907.05(D)(gross
sexual imposition) and a statute on prostitution. [R.C.
2907.26 (prostitution).
The reference to statutes enacted by the General
Assembly was added in 1980, the year in which the Rules
took effect. This reference did not appear in the earlier proposals that were rejected by the General Assembly. See 51
Ohio Bar 186 (1978); 50 Ohio Bar 236 (1977). These
statutes were considered "substantive" provisions and thus
cot.Jid not be superseded by the Rules. Giannelli, The
Proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence: The General Assembly,
Evidence, and Rulemaking, 29 CWRU L Rev 16, 53-55
(1978}.
Under the common law, an accused charged with rape
was permitted to introduce evidence of the victim's unchaste
character as circumstantial evidence of consent. E.g.,
McDermott v. State, 13 Ohio St. 332 (1862); McCombs v.
State, 8 Ohio St. 643 (1858). This rule rested on the assumption that a woman who has consented to premarital or
extramarital intercourse was more likely to consent than a
woman who had not consented to such past intercourse. In
recent years, this dubious assumption, along with other aspects of rape prosecutions, has been severely criticized.
Most states have responded by enacting "shield" laws which
limit the admissibility of evidence of the victim's character.
See 1 McCormick, Evidence § 193, at 682 (5th ed. 1999}
("In the 1970s, however, nearly all jurisdictions enacted
'rape shield' laws ....").
The Ohio shield law applies only in rape and gross sexual imposition prosecutions. See State v. Cotton, 113 Ohio
App.3d 125, 134, 680 N. E.2d 657 (1996) ("the rape-shield
statutes apply only to ... rape and gross sexual imposition"
and not to felonious sexual penetration); State v. Black, 85
Ohio App.3d 771, 778, 621 N.E.2d 484 (1993)("The charges
against the defendant consist of three counts of contributing
to the unruliness of a minor with no accompanying charge
of rape. Therefore, the rape-shield doctrine does not
apply."), appeal dismissed, 67 Ohio St.3d 1451, 619 N.E.2d
420 (1993).
The law is designed to protect several interests:
First, by guarding the complainant's sexual privacy and
protecting her from undue harassment, the law discourages the tendency in rape cases to try the victim rather
than the defendant. In line with this, the law may encourage the reporting of rape, thus aiding crime prevention.
Finally, by excluding evidence that is unduly inflammatory
and prejudicial, while being only marginally probative, the
statute is intended to aid in the truth-finding process.
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_,State v. Gi=!rdner, 59 Ohio St.2d 14, 17-18,391 N.E.2d
337 (1979).
The rape shield law excludes reputation, opinion, and specific acts evidence concerning the victim's past sexual history.
Exceptions
There are several exceptions. The first involves the (1)
the origin of semen, p"regnancy, or disease. In State v.
Trummer, 114 Ohio App.3d 456, 683 N.E.2d 392 (1996), appeal dismissed, 78 Ohio St.3d 1409, 675 N.E.2d 1249
(1997), the court of appeals held that expert testimony offered by the defendant to the effect that the defendant could
not have been the source of semen found on the victim's
clothing was inadmissible because the state offered no evidence on the semen. The court noted that the defendant
had admitted that he had sexual relations with the victim on
the night in question, but that the victim had consented. The
court concluded that ''there was no fact at issue relative to
the semen in question and, very obviously, the proffered evidence was to be presented simply to impeach the credibility
of the victim." ld. at 466.
The second involves the victim's past sexual activity with
the accused.
Other Requirements
The statute differs in two respects from the general treatment of character evidence under the Rules of Evidence.
First, the statute allows consideration of character evidence
only insofar as it relates to sexual activity between the victim
and defendant; Rule 404(A)(2) contains no such limitation.
Second, the statute permits specific instances of conduct to
be introduced; Rule 405(A) limits the methods of proof to
reputation and opinion evidence.
In addition, this evidence is admissible only to the extent
that a material fact is at issue and only if its inflammatory or
prejudicial nature does not outweigh its probative value. See
State v. Cotton, 113 Ohio App.3d 125, 131, 680 N.E.2d 657
(1996) ("Unlike the test provided in Evid.R. 403, requiring
that evidence must be excluded where its probative value is
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect, R.C.
2907.02(0) and 2907.05(0) provide simply for weighing the
probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect.").
Procedure
The statute also provides for a pretrial in-chambers resolution of these issues. R.C. 2907.02(E) (court shall resolve
admissibility issue in a hearing in chambers). See State v.
Cotton, 113 Ohio App.3d 125 130, 680 N.E.2d 657 (1996)
("These statutes clearly dictate that a trial court shall resolve the admissibility of testimony involving prior sexual
acts of the defendant in chambers .... [A] sidebar conference does not satisfy the requirements of an in-chambers
hearing.").
Prior false accusations
In State v. Boggs, 63 Ohio St.3d 418, 421, 588 N.E.2d
813 (1992), the trial judge, based on the rape shield law,
precluded the defense from cross-examining the alleged
victim about a prior false accusation of rape. The Ohio
Supreme Court disagreed, ruling that "[f]alse accusations,
where no sexual activity is involved, do not fall within the
rape shield statute." A rape accusation could be false in two
different ways: (1) where there has never been sexual intercourse, and (2) where there has been intercourse but it was
consensual.

This line of questioning involves impeachment by prior
acts that reflect untruthful character, a credibility issue. Rule
608(8), which governs this issue, permits inquiry on crossexamination but prohibits extrinsic evidence. The defense,
of course, has to establish that the accusation was false.
If, however, the prior accusation involved sexual activity,
the rape shield law prohibits this line of questioning. The
Court summarized its holding as follows:
[8]efore cross-examination of a rape victim as to prior
false rape accusations may proceed, the trial judge shall
hold an in camera hearing to ascertain whether such testimony involves sexual activity and thus is inadmissible
under R.C. 2907.02(0), or is totally unfounded and admissible for impeachment of the victim. It is within the
sound discretion of the trial court, pursuant to Evid. R.
608(8), whether to allow such cross-examination.ld. at
424.
See also State v. Black, 85 Ohio App.3d 771, 778, 621
N.E.2d 484 (1993) ("[8]ecause prior false accusations of
rape do not constitute sexual activity of the victim, the rapeshield doctrine does not exclude such evidence."), appeal
dismissed, 67 Ohio St.3d 1451,619 N.E.2d 420 (1993).
Accused's Conduct
The rape shield law also applies to past sexual activity of
the accused. The statute excludes reputation, opinion, or
specific acts evidence concerning the accused's past sexual
history unless it involves evidence of (1) the origin of
semen, pregnancy, or disease, (2) the accused's past sexual activity with the victim, or (3) other-acts evidence admissible under R.C. 2945.59. Further, this evidence is admissible
only to the extent it relates to a material issue and "its inflammatory or prejudicial nature does not outweigh its probative value." R.C. 2907.02(0) (rape); R.C. 2907.05(0)
(gross sexual imposition).
Unlike Rule 403, this weighing process does not include
the term "substantially." See State v. Clemons, 94 Ohio
App.3d 701, 711, 641 N.E.2d 778 (1994) (accused's "problem" with masturbation improperly admitted in rape case;
"The connection is simply too tenuous."), appeal dismissed,
70 Ohio St.3d 1454,639 N.E.2d 793 (1994). Moreover, a
defendant who testifies that he had "never in my entire life
ever had sex with any child" waives the statutory limitations
regarding specific instances of sexual activity. State v.
Banks, 71 Ohio App.3d 214, 220, 593 N.E.2d 346 (1991 ).
Waiver
Ohio courts have recognized that the protections of the
statute may be waived. If, for example, the victim asserted
that she had never engaged in sexual activity, the defense
may be permitted to present evidence of the victim's sexual
activity with persons other than the defendant. See State v.
Malin, 1999 WL 1775, No. 97CA006898 (9th Oist. Ct. App.,
Lorain, 12-30-98). In that case, the victim was a mentally
retarded 25-year-old woman. Her mother testified about her
limited grasp of sexual matters and her disinterest in sex.
The court of appeals held that the mother's testimony did
not "constitute a waiver of the protections of the rape shield
statute" because the mother "did not expressly state that her
daughter had never engaged in sexual activity, nor did she
state that her daughter had no knowledge of what would
constitute sexual activity." ld.
Sanctions
In Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S.145 (1991), the United
States Supreme Court ruled that the exclusion of defense
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evidence _for failingto comply with the notice provision of a
rape shield statute was not per se unconstitutional. The
Court indicated, however, that exclusion in a particular case
may be unconstitutional.

In State v. Williams, 21 Ohio St.3d 33, 487 N.E.2d 560
(1986), the Court again considered the issue. The alleged
victim testified that she was "gay" and thus would not have
consented to sex with a man. The defendant claimed consent and attempted to call a witness to testify about the victim's reputation as a prostitute and another male who
claimed to have had sex with the victim. The trial court excluded, based on the shield law, the testimony of both witnesses. The Supreme Court agreed that the evidence was
inadmissible under the rape shield law, but also found that
"the rape shield law as applied in this case violates appellee's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation." ld. at 36.
In In re Michael;n9 Ohio Ap-p.3d 112, 118, 694 N.E.2d
538 (1997), the court of appeals noted that "there may be
circumstances in which a defendant's confrontation right requires that evidence of a complainant's prior sexual conduct
be admitted, notwithstanding the fact that the evidence
would otherwise be excluded by the rape shield law." The
court found in Michael that evidence that the child victim
had been abused before in the same manner he alleged he
was abused by the defendant was "essential" to the defense
that the defendant was innocent and that the prior abuse explained the child's sexual knowledge. ld.

Constitutionality
Because rape shield laws preclude evidence that is arguably exculpatory, their constitutionality has been questioned. See generally Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the
State and Federal Courts: A Proposal for the Second
Decade, 70 Minn. L. Rev. 763 (1986); Tanford & Bocchino,
Rape Victim Shield Laws and the Sixth Amendment, 128 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 544 (1980); Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's
Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 Colum. L.
Rev. 1 (1977).
Two United States Supreme Court cases, Davis v.
Alaska, 415l).S. 308 (1974), and Chambers v. Mississippi,
410 U.S. 284 (1973), are usually cited in support of the defendant's right to introduce evidence of the victim's character, at least in some.circumstances. Congress recognized
the force of the constitutional argument in enacting a federal
shield law. Federal Rule 412 recognizes an exception
where exclosion ''would violate the constitutional rights of
the defendant."
In Davis the Court held that a state statute excluding evidence of a juvenile adjudication (a type of shield law) violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation.
In Chambers the Court held that the application of state evidentiary rules that excluded critical and reliable defense evidence violated due process. Nevertheless, the shield laws
have survived constitutional attacks, at least when the attacks are facial. See 1 McCormick, Evidence § 193, at 685
(5th ed. 1999). Simply put, evidence of past sexual history
lack~_pr()IJCitl\f~\fal_ue inmost cases. Individual cases, however, are a different matter. For example, in State v. Jalo, 27
Ore. App. 845, 850-51, 557 P.2d 1359 (1976), the defendant
denied that he had sexual intercourse with the complainant.
The appellate court held it error to exclude evidence that the
complainant had had sexual relations with the defendant's
son and others, which facts had become known to the defendant and he had informed the complainant that he would
notifY her parents. Application of the shield law in this case
precluded the defendant from establishing the complainant's
motive to accuse him falsely, the core of his defense.
In State v. Gardner, 59 Ohio St.2d 14, 19 n. 5, 391
N.E.2d 337 (1979), the Ohio Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the Ohio statute as applied in that case,
leaving open, however, the possibility that different facts
might produce a different result.

WITNESS'S CHARACTER
The third exception to the general prohibition against the
use of character evidence concerns a witness's character.
This exception, recognized in Rule 404(A)(3), involves the
use of character evidence for impeachment and is therefore
limited to the character trait of untruthfulness. Unlike the
other exceptions of Rule 404(A), this exception applies in
civil as well as in criminal cases. It applies whenever a witness, including a criminal defendant, takes the stand to testify.
Rule 404(A)(3) does not specify the conditions under
which character evidence may be used to impeach a witness. Instead, the rule contains a cross-reference to the
rules regulating the impeachment use of character evidence. Rule 608(A) permits the use of reputation and opinion evidence to impeach for untruthful character. Rule
608(B) permits the use of specific instances of conduct that
did not result in conviction to be used for impeachment
under specified circumstances. Rule 609 governs impeachment by evidence of prior convictions.
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